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WOULD YOU PAY FOR TRANSPARENTLY USELESS ADVICE? A TEST OF
BOUNDARIES OF BELIEFS IN THE FOLLY OF PREDICTIONS
Nattavudh Powdthavee and Yohanes E. Riyanto*
Abstract—Standard economic models assume that the demand for expert
predictions arises only under the conditions in which individuals are
uncertain about the underlying process generating the data and there is a
strong belief that past performances predict future performances. We set
up the strongest possible test of these assumptions. In contrast to the theo-
retical suggestions made in the literature, people are willing to pay for
predictions of truly random outcomes after witnessing only a short streak
of accurate predictions live in the lab. We discuss potential explanations
and implications of such irrational learning in the contexts of economics
and finance.
[Expert] intuition cannot be trusted in the absence of stable
regularities in the environment.
—Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011)
I. Introduction
WHY do humans pay for expert predictions when mostfuture events are predominantly unpredictable? What
explains, for example, the significant amount of money
spent in the finance industry on people who appear to be
commenting about random walks,1 payments for services by
political and economic forecasters who are often only
slightly better at forecasting the future than nonexperts,2 or
some other false-expert setting?3
Economists typically dismiss such behaviors as random
error in decision making. This is the notion that an average
person is disinclined to commit such errors and that people
rationally pay for expert predictions only when they are a
priori uncertain about the underlying data-generating pro-
cess, yet maintain the belief that some systematic predic-
tions are potentially possible. What this implies is that
economists tend to set a high bar for the way people ratio-
nalize their actions ex ante; that is, a significant degree of
uncertainty would need to be present in our mind before we
could be persuaded to pay for a prediction that is ultimately
useless.
By contrast, the psychology literature assumes that
human beings are hypersensitive at detecting agency, even
when none exists, to help them explain phenomena that
cannot be easily explained. This implies that on average,
people will be happy to pay for advice that is generally
counterintuitive if they believe there is an intelligent agent
making the predictions for them. Such a divide between the
two social science disciplines in the beliefs of how people’s
preferences for expert predictions are formed is scientifi-
cally unattractive.
While we cannot deny from innumerable observations
that individuals can be induced to believe in the ‘‘hot
hands’’ of experts (and consequently have been exploited
by charlatans, witch doctors, fortune-tellers, casino opera-
tors, and mutual fund managers the world over for centuries),
we know much less about the boundaries of such seemingly
irrational behaviors. For example, we do not know the extent
to which people can be induced to believe in the hot hand of
an expert if it is a priori clear that the event is truly random
and if accurate expert predictions can be explained only by
luck and not skills.
Our paper seeks to contribute to this research area by
investigating whether people are willing to pay for predic-
tions in a situation in which there is true randomness and
predictions are blatantly useless. In a laboratory setting of
clearly nonexistent expertise, can an average person be chal-
lenged to switch from having the correct prior belief that
‘‘outcomes are determined by chance and predictions are
inherently useless’’ to the false belief that ‘‘predictions pro-
vide useful information about the future,’’ thus leading the
person to buy subsequent predictions at a fixed price, if she
had recently observed an improbable streak of successful
predictions being made in front of her live? In contrast to the
literature, we found that the answer is yes and that the size
of the error that people systematically make is large.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II presents a
brief review of the relevant literature, section III outlines
the stylized dynamic inference model, and section IV
describes the data and experimental procedures. Empirical
strategy is discussed in section V. Results are then laid out
in section VI. Section VII provides our discussion, the
implications of our results, and concluding remarks. Addi-
tional supporting information is in appendixes B, C, and D
in the online supplement.
II. Background
There is little economic theory in this area. A few excep-
tions are the work of Matthew Rabin and Dimitri Vayanos.
In their papers, Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos
(2010) outline a model in which believers of the law of
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small numbers—those who believe that a small sample of
signals represents the parent population from which it is
drawn (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971)—will be willing to
pay for the services of financial analysts after observing ran-
domly occurring streaks of profitable financial performances
provided by mutual fund managers. Such a belief in the hot
hand of a financial expert arises because individuals overin-
fer the financial manager’s ability following a streak of suc-
cessful stock performances. In other words, an investor who
believes that the performance of a mutual fund is a combina-
tion of the manager’s skills and luck will at first underesti-
mate the likelihood that a manager of average ability will
exhibit a streak of above- or below-average performance.
Following good or bad streaks, however, the investor will
revert to overestimate the likelihood that the manager is
above or below average, and so in turn will overinfer that
the streak of unusual performance will continue (see Gilo-
vich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; Burns, & Corpus, 2004;
Asparouhova, Hertzel, & Lemmon, 2009). Rabin and Vaya-
nos’s model thus predicts that following a streak of good
signals in settings where there is an element of skill involved
in generating such a streak (e.g., a sequence of successful
performances by stockbrokers or managers of actively man-
aged funds), believers of the law of small numbers will be
happy to pay for real-time price information provided by
these financial ‘‘experts’’ even though it is well documented
that actively managed funds do not outperform their market
benchmark on average (see, Fama, 1991; Cahart, 1997). The
key assumption here is that in order to form a belief in the
hot hand of a manager, individuals must be unsure about the
data-generating process of stock movements in the first
place, but nevertheless hold the belief that past returns help
to predict future returns (and that past management perfor-
mances help to predict future performances).
Econometric evidence on the evolution of beliefs in
expert predictions is also scarce. Much of the literature in
this field tends to focus on situations in which no experts
were present to generate predictions of future i.i.d. signals.
For example, Croson and Sundali (2005) show that in a
game of roulette, casino gamblers tend to bet against a suffi-
ciently long streak rather than with a streak, which is con-
sistent with the gambler’s fallacy, while at the same time
gamblers tend to bet on more numbers after winning than
after losing, which is a behavior consistent with the hot
hand effect. Terrell and Farmer (1996) and Terrell (1998)
find evidence of the gambler’s fallacy in horse and dog
racing. The authors show that gamblers are less likely to bet
on repeat winners by post position. For example, if the ani-
mal in post position 3 wins a race, then in the next race, the
(different) animal in post position 3 is significantly under-
bet. Using a computerized roulette game, Ayton and Fischer
(2004) show that subjects tend to believe in the gambler’s
fallacy with respect to the sequence of outcomes of the
roulette wheel. Yet when the subjects’ role is to predict the
outcomes of the roulette wheel, they tend to overpredict
how well or badly they would do at predicting based on
their previous streak of predictions, thus exhibiting the hot
hand fallacy.
More recently, Guryan and Kearney (2008) found unique
evidence of the potential hot hand effect in stores that sell
lottery numbers. The authors show that in the week follow-
ing the sale of a large-prize-winning ticket, the winning
store experiences a significant increase in relative sales for
the winning lottery game. Using a unique panel data of lot-
tery players, Jørgensen, Suetens, and Tyran (2011) present
evidence that while most lottery players tend to pick the
same set of numbers week after week without regard to the
numbers drawn in the lottery in previous weeks, people who
do change the set do so in such a way that is consistent with
the law of small numbers. On average, these switchers move
away from numbers that have been recently drawn (the gam-
bler’s fallacy) and move toward numbers that are on a streak
(the hot hand fallacy). However, in both scenarios—‘‘lucky’’
lottery stores and ‘‘lucky’’ lottery numbers—the switches in
preferences that are consistent with the hot hand effect are
often short-lived. For example, Clotfelter and Cook (1991,
1993) and Teller (1994) show that shortly after a lottery
number wins, individuals are significantly more likely to bet
on it. The effect soon diminishes: a few months later, the
winning number is as popular as the average number.
To the best of our knowledge, only one other study has
explicitly tested the implications of expert predictions in a
pure i.i.d. setting. In experiments ran by Huber, Kirchler, and
Stockl (2010), participants were asked to decide between a
risky and a risk-free investment. If they opt for the former,
they were given an opportunity to either make the risky
investment themselves or delegate the decision to an expert
for some fees. There are two equally likely investment out-
comes resembling coin flip outcomes. The procedure is
implemented by asking participants to either bet on com-
puter-generated outcomes of coin flips or rely on randomized
‘‘expert’’ predictions. When randomized expert predictions
were chosen, participants were told that the experts would
make the investment decision by choosing heads or tails. The
outcome of this investment decision would be determined by
a computer-generated coin flip. The researchers were able to
show that people who rely on randomized experts tend to pick
experts who have been successful in the past, which is consis-
tent with the hot hand fallacy. Those who decide the outcome
of coin flips on their own tend to behave consistently with the
gambler’s fallacy, as the frequency of betting on heads (tails)
decreases after streaks of heads (tails).
However, there are some potential shortcomings of their
study. First, instead of real coins, a ‘‘virtual’’ coin was used
in the experiment to generate the signals. The use of virtual
coin could have induced the erroneous belief that the coin
was not fair and that its outcomes were predictable. Further-
more, participants were specifically told that they are play-
ing an investment game that is designed to replicate an
actual asset market. The coin flip is used as an analogy to
this investment game. Since the setting is primarily framed
as an investment context, it is thus not transparently clear
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whether participants would indeed consider the setting as
equivalent to a pure coin flip decision. It is possible that the
investment framing might subconsciously anchor partici-
pants’ cognitive thinking on the expertness of the experts
and give participants a confounding impression that skills
were involved in predicting the outcomes of the investment
decision.
Second, in their setup, participants must pay a surcharge
fee and a management fee when they decide to engage an
expert to make an investment on their behalf. If they decide
to continue relying on the same expert to make investments,
they would no longer need to pay the surcharge fee. Conse-
quently, the net earnings conditional on winning would be
higher when they continue using the same expert. This may
induce participants who have an inclination to rely on the
expert in the first place to continue using the expert to save
costs.
Third, the investment decision in their paper is a simple
binary decision of whether to invest. Participants do not
make any decision on the amount to invest and their earn-
ings conditional on winning remain constant. In contrast,
we allow participants to vary the amount of bet, thereby
varying their earnings conditional on winning. By analyzing
the betting amount, we are able to capture the willingness
of participants to treat the coin toss predictions more ser-
iously on observing a streak of correct predictions.
Finally, in their paper, when participants choose not to
rely on an expert to make the investment in any particular
round, they would never know whether the expert would
have made a correct decision in that round. This is because
the advice given by these experts would never be revealed to
participants. In contrast, in our paper, even when participants
decide not to rely on the coin flip prediction prior to making
their bet, they would still be able to know ex post whether
the coin flip prediction would have been correct. Such infor-
mation would influence participants’ decision to switch from
making their own bet to relying on the coin flip prediction.
All in all, two main lessons may be learned from the lit-
erature. The first is that humans tend to behave in such a
way that is consistent with the gambler’s fallacy in situa-
tions where the underlying mechanism generating the streak
of signals is transparently random. The second is that the
hot hand fallacy normally arises in situations where human
skills are a priori, albeit erroneously, perceived as part of
the streak-generating process. To quote Huber et al. (2010),
‘‘The hot hand belief is usually attributed to human skilled
performance, whereas the gambler’s fallacy is often attribu-
ted to inanimate chance mechanism’’ (p. 446).
Our paper builds on this small literature and sets out to
test one of the key assumptions in the model by Rabin and
Vayanos (2010):4 in a truly random situation in which
experts’ predictions are a priori known to be transparently
useless, people’s behaviors will be influenced only by the
gambler’s fallacy (a luck-related perception) and not by the
hot hand (a performance-related perception) of the nonexis-
tent expert.
III. Experimental Framework
A. Data
To investigate the conditions under which people would
be willing to pay for predictions of truly random events, a
series of laboratory experiments was conducted on volun-
tary participants in Thailand and Singapore. We ran our first
set of experiments in Thailand in December 2011. The ran-
domly selected participants were undergraduate students at
the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce and Chu-
lalongkorn University in Bangkok (N ¼ 177). We ran our
second set of experiments in Singapore in March 2012.
Here, the volunteer participants originated from randomly
drawn undergraduate students at Nanyang Technological
University (N ¼ 201). Overall, participants were from var-
ious schools and faculties, including humanities and social
sciences, engineering, sciences, and business and account-
ing. We ran twelve sessions in total (four in Thailand and
eight in Singapore) and recruited approximately 45 people
per session in Thailand and 30 people per session in Singa-
pore.
The experiment conducted in Thailand was done manu-
ally using pen and paper, while the experiment conducted
in Singapore was computerized and programmed with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).5 This computerized
experiment was done in two experimental labs. Upon arriv-
ing at the experiment venue, participants were randomly
assigned to one of the two labs. Once they entered the lab,
there were randomly assigned to cubicles. Once seated, they
were asked to complete two tasks. In the first task, they
placed bets on the outcomes of five rounds of ‘‘fair’’ coin
flips. To ensure the fairness of the coins used in the experi-
ment, from the beginning we made explicitly clear to parti-
cipants the following:
 The coins will be supplied by the participants rather
than the experimenters.
 The coins will be changed after the second and fourth
flips.
 A volunteer participant in the experiment will be ran-
domly chosen to step out in front of everyone and flip
the coin.
 The coin flipper will be changed in every round.
Each participant was given an initial endowment with
which to make their bets in the five rounds of coin flips.4 The model by Rabin and Vayanos (2010) is a more tractable version
of an earlier model by Rabin (2002) and a more suitable setup to analyze
the hot hand fallacy. For this reason, we adopt the specification of Rabin
and Vayanos (2010) rather than that of Rabin (2002).
5 We outline the experimental procedures in appendix B, which can be
found in the online supplement.
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There was a minimum bet of 10 tokens per round, and parti-
cipants were not allowed to go bankrupt before the final
round was reached. Participants in Thailand were given an
initial 100 tokens. Since a few participants in Thailand went
bankrupt before the final round, when we ran it in Singa-
pore, we decided to give each one more tokens at the start
of the experiment, increasing the number to 300. Placing a
correct bet was worth double, and an incorrect one was
worth 0 in return. Each participant was also given at the
beginning of the experiment five numbered envelopes,
which were taped on each cubicle’s table. Contained within
was a ‘‘prediction’’ of the coin flip that had not happened
yet in each of the numbered rounds. In each round, partici-
pants were given an opportunity to pay a fixed price of 10
tokens to see the inside of the corresponding numbered
envelope before a bet was placed and the coin flipped. All
other participants who decided not to pay were instructed to
open the corresponding numbered envelope for free imme-
diately after the flip in order to view whether the prediction
matched the outcome. Great care was taken not to provide
any misleading information—for example, on who made
the predictions, whether the predictions were made by an
expert or a group of experts, or how the predictions were
generated—which could have potentially primed partici-
pants into buying (or not buying) the predictions by evoking
the impression that the underlying process generating accu-
rate predictions was humanly possible. Participants were
then told that the remaining endowment at the end of the
fifth round would be converted to either Singapore dollars
(SG$) or Thai baht at the exchange rate of 50 points ¼
SG$1 (25 Thai baht) or approximately US$0.9.
To guarantee that a significant number of participants
received at least four consecutive correct predictions in five
rounds of fair coin flips, predictions were generated and
assigned in such a way that approximately half the partici-
pants received one correct prediction after round 1, ½  ½
of N received two correct predictions after round 2, and so
on (see figure 1). This method of randomization-in-random-
ization (R-in-R)—that is, the process of randomizing people
within the same session into control and treatment groups—
ensured that at least one participant per session would ran-
domly receive all-correct predictions irrespective of the
actual outcomes of the coin flips. The R-in-R design also
ensures that we have a random split of participants with
divergent beliefs about the predictability of the coin in the
control and treatment groups. Of the 378 participants from
the two countries, 191 received a correct prediction in the
first round of coin flips, 92 all-correct predictions after the
first two rounds, 48 after the first three rounds, and 23 after
the first four rounds.6
In order to ensure that participants did not cheat by either
opening a different envelope to the one that was bought or
opening one that had not been purchased in the correspond-
ing round, we hired more than the usual number of research
assistants (at least five research assistants per session) to
help with supervising the experiment. We stationed these
research assistants at various locations inside the labs.
Given their locations and the size of the labs, it was rela-
tively easy for them to spot any cheating (i.e., participants
opening the envelopes without paying or opening envelopes
meant for other rounds). Throughout the experiment, we
did not find any incidence of cheating. Participants were
also not forced to open the envelopes during the course of
the experiment if they wished not to. All but one participant
from the Psychology Department chose not to open the
envelopes to see any of the predictions. We dropped this
participant from the sample.
In the second task of the experiment, participants com-
pleted a set of probability tests (which was incentivized
with each correct answer given ¼ SG$0.20), as well as a set
of standard control questionnaires. At the end of the experi-
ment, all participants were debriefed on the nature of the
experiment either immediately (Thailand) or later by e-mail
(Singapore).
B. The First-Round Buyers
Of the 378 participants, 55 (14.5%) were first-round pre-
diction buyers: they bought the prediction before any se-
quence of correct or incorrect predictions was observed. Of
these 55, 41 (74.55%) were Singaporeans and 14 (25.45%)
FIGURE 1.—THE COIN TREE
6 The method was first seen on U.K. television in 2008, demonstrated
by the British magician Derren Brown. In his show, The System, Brown
used the technique to illustrate how he was able to predict, for one parti-
cular person, six consecutive wins at a horse race.
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were Thais. For these subjects, it may be that they did not
completely grasp what we had stated earlier in the experi-
ment about the fairness of the coins, or they confidently
believed that coins are predictable (i.e., those with a posi-
tive prior on predictions being useful from the start). Since
we cannot distinguish the reasons, our main focus will be
on the 323 non-first-round buyers. We briefly return in sec-
tion VIA to analyze the first-round buyers.
We report in appendix A the descriptive statistics of the
buying behaviors of first-round buyers—all and by national-
ity—and all non-first-round buyers.
C. Compliers versus Defiers among Prediction Buyers
(excluding First-Round Buyers)
Conditioning on buying, most people who bought predic-
tions went on to bet according to that prediction. In round
j ¼ 2, 16 of 19 (84%) went on to place the same bet as the
prediction. For round j ¼ 3, 16 of 18 (89%) bet the same as
the prediction, while 17 of 22 (77%) bet according to the
prediction in round j ¼ 4. And finally, for round j ¼ 5, 21
of 29 (72%) bet the same as the prediction. These figures
imply that although not everyone who bought predictions
went on to bet according to that prediction, a large propor-
tion of people did.
IV. Empirical Strategy
A. The Stylized Model
To fix ideas for our empirical models, we initially assume
that each subject in the experiment observes, just before
placing a bet on the outcome of a coin flip in round j, two
sequences of signals whose probability distributions depend
on some underlying states (Rabin & Vayanos, 2010). The
first signal, sj, is the outcome of a fair coin flip in round j,
which takes the value of 1 if the outcome is a heads and 0 if
it is tails. The second signal, aj, represents the success rate
of the prediction given by the affixed envelope in round j,
which takes the value of 1 if the prediction matched the out-
come of the coin flip in the corresponding j and 0 other-
wise.7 To the subjects, the signal sj in rounds j ¼ 1, 2, . . ., 5
is
sj ¼ lþ ej; (1)
and the signal aj in rounds j ¼ 1, 2, . . . is
aj ¼ uþ tj; (2)
where l is the long-run mean of the i.i.d. signals, which is
fixed at 0.5 for a series of fair coin flips. To the individual,
the envelopes’ long-run predictability of the outcomes of
fair coin flips, u, is also a priori fixed at 0.5, and ej and tj
are i.i.d. normal shocks with means 0 and variances
r2e ;r
2
t > 0. We can also interpret the shock tj as the envel-
ope’s luck at predicting sj in round j. More important, sj is
assumed to be determined independently: an outcome of a
coin flip is determined by the actual flip rather than by a
prediction given by an envelope in the corresponding
round.
According to Rabin and Vayanos (2010), behaviors of
the gambler’s fallacy nature arise when subjects have a mis-
taken belief that the sequences fej; tjgj1 are not i.i.d. but
exhibit systematic reversal.8 What this implies is that fol-
lowing a streak of s (i.e., heads) up to j  1, subjects will
develop an erroneous belief that outcome in round j is more
likely to be 1 s (i.e., tails), and following a streak of a
(correct predictions) up to j  1, subjects will develop an
erroneous belief that the envelope’s prediction in j is likely
to be 1 a (or incorrect).
There are no physical costs that could be incurred on the
subject if he or she decides to switch from betting s (heads)
in j  1 to betting 1 s (tails), and vice versa. There is,
however, a fixed cost that each subject has to pay to observe
the prediction of the coin flip before and not after having to
place a bet in the corresponding round. Assuming for sim-
plicity that subjects face no budget constraints in their bet-
ting and purchasing decisions, we can write our first set of
testable hypotheses on behaviors influenced by the gam-
bler’s fallacy as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Subjects’ betting behaviors will generally
be influenced by the gambler’s fallacy after having
observed a streak of s (heads) or 1 s (tails) up to
j  1.
Hypothesis 2: Following a streak of a (correct predic-
tions) up to j  1, subjects will pay to see the predic-
tion in the next period and then bet the opposite.
Hypothesis 3: Following a streak of 1 a (incorrect pre-
dictions) up to j  1, subjects will pay to see the pre-
diction in the next period and then bet according to the
prediction provided by the envelope.
The envelopes’ long-run predictability of a series of fair
coin flips, u, is a priori known and fixed at 0.5. This is
because it should be transparent to anyone able to carry out
simple probabilistic calculations that there is no systematic
method to accurately predict pure i.i.d. outcomes—in our
case, coin flips. However, we will allow for subjects’ per-
ceptions about the nature of u to be influenced by a streak
of a (correct predictions) or 1 a (incorrect predictions) up
to j  1. More specifically, we allow subjects’ perceptions
7 It should be noted that the second set of signals is viewed privately
and allowed to vary across subjects in our experiment.
8 The gambler’s fallacy is also explained in Rabin (2002), albeit in a
different modeling setup. In Rabin (2002), the gambler’s fallacy arises
due to people’s false belief that the signals are drawn from an urn with no
replacement. The absence of replacement creates a negative autocorrela-
tion between successive draws, making people believe that it is less likely
that the same signal is drawn again in the next period. For example, in the
case of two flips of a fair coin, the probability of a heads appearing again
in the second flip after appearing in the first flip would be (1/2)(1/3)
instead of (1/2) (1/2).
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about the envelopes’ long-run predictability to change from
being fixed at 0.5 to one that evolves according to the auto-
regressive process:
uj ¼ 0:5þ q uj1  0:5
 þ gj; (3)
where q 2 ½0; 1Þ is the reversion rate to the long-run aver-
age of 0.5 and gj is an i.i.d. normal shock with mean 0 and
variance r2g and that is independent of tj. If it is possible
for subjects to develop a belief in serially correlated varia-
tion in u (i.e., q > 0), then, in principle, a belief in the hot
hand (or cold hand, in the case of a sequence of incorrect
predictions) can develop, overtaking the gambler’s fallacy,
after observing a streak of a (correct predictions) or 1 a
(incorrect predictions) up to j  1. This produces our sec-
ond set of testable hypotheses on behaviors influenced by
the hot/cold hand fallacy as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Following a streak of a (correct predic-
tions), subjects will pay to see the prediction in the
next period and then bet according to the prediction
provided by the envelope.
Hypothesis 5: Following a streak of 1 a (incorrect pre-
dictions) up to j  1, subjects will pay to see the pre-
diction in the next period and then bet the opposite.
Finally, hypotheses 2 to 4 also imply that:
Hypothesis 6: Subjects who pay for a prediction in j will
treat the paid-for information seriously by placing a
higher bet in the corresponding round.
B. Testing Participants’ Beliefs in the Gambler’s Fallacy
(Hypothesis 1)
To test whether participants’ betting behaviors are influ-
enced by the gambler’s fallacy, we estimate for round j the
following equation:
BHij ¼ aj þ b1jSHj1 þ b2jSTj1 þ djPij
þ c1j SHj1  Pij
 þ c2j STj1  Pij
 
þ X0ihþ uij;
(4)
where i indexes individuals and j indexes experimental
round; BHij is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1
if the individual bets heads in round j and 0 if the individual
bets tails; SHj  1 is a dummy representing a streak of heads
up to the round j  1; STj1 is a dummy representing a
streak of tails up to the previous round (round j  1); Pij is
an indicator variable representing whether the subject i paid
10 tokens to see the prediction in round j; X
0
i is a vector of
control variables; and uij is the error term. We will also esti-
mate equation (4) separately for the subsample of observa-
tions with heads and tails as the prediction outcome. More
formally, we test whether:
 Subjects are more likely to bet tails in round j (b1j < 0)
following a streak of heads up to round j  1. Simi-
larly, if a streak of tails is observed until round j  1,
then the individual is more likely to bet heads in round
j (b2j > 0).
 Depending on the prediction in round j, those who paid
for it will place a bet that corresponds to the hot hand
of the expert’s prediction rather than be influenced by
the gambler’s fallacy. What this implies is that subjects
will be more likely to bet heads following a streak of
heads up to j  1 if they had bought the prediction and
the prediction told them to bet heads—that is, going
with the streak. Similarly, subjects will be more likely
to bet tails following a streak of tails up to j  1 if they
had bought the prediction and the prediction told them
to bet tails.
C. Testing the Effects of Past Predictions on Buying
Behaviors (Hypotheses 2–5)
In order to test whether a streak of past predictions mat-
ters to the subject’s purchasing decision in the current round
of coin flips, we estimate the following buying equation:
Pij ¼ aj þ /1jSCij1 þ /2jSIij1
þ kjPij1 þ X0ij#þ eij;
(5)
where SCij1 is a set of dummy variables representing a
streak of correct predictions up to round j  1; SIij1 is a set
of dummy variables representing a streak of incorrect pre-
dictions up to round j  1; Pij1 is the decision to buy in
round j  1; and eij is the error term. Our key parameters of
interest here are /1j and /2j, which represent the average
effects of observing successful and failed streaks of past
predictions on the subject’s buying decisions in round j,
holding buying decisions in the previous round constant.
Note that for j ¼ 2, the estimated effect of obtaining a cor-
rect prediction in round 1 is the effect relative to obtaining
an incorrect prediction in round 1. For j ¼ {3,4,5}, the esti-
mated effect of obtaining all-correct, or all-incorrect, pre-
dictions prior to round j is thus the effect relative to obtain-
ing some correct and some incorrect signals, which is
typically the outcomes that subjects expected to see for pre-
dictions made on truly random events. Here, we test
whether subjects are more likely to buy the prediction after
observing a streak of predictions up to round j1 (/1j;
/2j > 0).
D. Testing the Gambler’s Fallacy versus the Hot Hand
Fallacy in Behaviors toward the Paid-For Predictions
(Hypotheses 2–5)
In order to test whether subjects’ behaviors toward the
paid-for predictions are influenced more by the gambler’s
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fallacy (hypotheses 2 and 3) or the hot hand fallacy
(hypotheses 4 and 5), we estimate the following equation:
Cij ¼ pj þ d1jSCij1 þ d2jSIij1 þ sjPij
þ U1j SCij1  Pij
 þ U2j SIij1  Pij
 
þ X0i@ þ fij;
(6)
where Cij is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
individual bets the same as the predicted envelope in round j,
and 0 otherwise, and nij is the error term. Here, we test
whether subjects bet according to the prediction or against
the prediction following a streak of successful and failed pre-
dictions up to round j1. Provided that the gambler’s fallacy
dominates, we should expect to see U1j < 0 and U2j > 0. By
contrast, we should expect to see U1j > 0 and U2j < 0 in
cases where the hot or cold hand fallacy dominates.
E. Testing the Effect of Buying Predictions on Betting
Behaviors (Hypothesis 6)
The final equation tests whether the subjects who bought
the predictions ended up treating them seriously. Here, a
natural question is whether the amount of endowment used
in each bet is larger on average among buyers than non-
buyers. We can test this by estimating the following bet
amount equation,
EBij ¼ lj þ pjPij þ -jEBij1 þ X
0
ixþ vij; (7)
where EBij denotes the log of the endowment amount used
to bet by individual i in round j and vij is the error term. The
null hypothesis here is that buyers will tend to treat the
paid-for predictions seriously and consequently place larger
bets than nonbuyers (pj > 0).
All four equations are estimated using OLS (linear prob-
ability model) with robust standard errors.9
F. Control Variables
Depending on the outcome variable, the control vari-
ables, X
0
i, may consist of gender; country (Thailand versus
Singapore); endowment in round j; a dummy variable repre-
senting whether the subject bought the prediction in the pre-
vious round; the proportion of correct answers in a statisti-
cal test; a streak of coins coming up heads or tails up to
round j  1; an indicator variable representing whether the
subject had made a wrong bet in the previous round and its
interaction with the decision to buy in j  1 variable; a
dummy variable for whether the subject followed a fixed
betting strategy by betting either heads or tails in every
round; and a dummy variable for whether the subject acts
according to the prediction or deviates from it in the pre-
vious round and its interaction with the decision to buy in
j  1 variable.
V. Results
A. Are Subjects’ Betting Behaviors Influenced by the
Gambler’s Fallacy?
Table 1 tests whether non-first-round buyers are subject
to the gambler’s fallacy in their betting behaviors. Here, the
dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a
value of 1 if the participant chooses to bet heads in round j
and 0 if he chooses to bet tails in round j. Since the same
sequence of coin flips is observed by all participants in a
given session and there are 12 sessions in total, we have
118 observations of two heads after the first two rounds and
152 observations of two tails after the first two rounds ( j ¼
1 and j ¼ 2). The number of consecutive heads and tails
becomes even smaller at the start of round 4; there are only
23 observations of three heads after the first three rounds
and 48 observations of three tails after the first three rounds
( j ¼ 1, j ¼ 2, and j ¼ 3). Our focus will be on the subject’s
propensity to bet heads following streaks of heads and tails
in rounds j ¼ 3 and j ¼ 4.
Looking at columns 1 (All; Round j ¼ 3) and 4 (All;
Round j ¼ 4) of table 1, we can see, based on the specifica-
tion in equation (4), that participants generally behave
according to the gambler’s fallacy:
 Participants are approximately 28 to 31 percentage
points less likely to bet heads in round j if a streak of
heads has been observed up to round j1.
 Participants are approximately 17 percentage points
more likely to bet heads in round j if a streak of tails
has been observed up to round j1.
These estimated effects are also statistically robust at con-
ventional confidence levels and are robust to controlling for
the subject’s gender and nationality.
A more interesting pattern emerges when the ‘‘bought
prediction in j’’ dummy and its interaction with the streak
variables are introduced as independent variables in the
‘‘betting heads in round j’’ regression equations. Condition-
ing on the prediction in round j being heads, there is an off-
setting effect to the gambler’s fallacy for participants who
bought the prediction and recently observed two consecu-
tive heads up to j1: the net effects on betting heads for
these individuals are (0.015 þ 0.582 ¼ 0.597; SE ¼ 0.083)
in round j ¼ 3 and (0.067 þ 0.536 ¼ 0.602; SE ¼ 0.209) in
round j ¼ 4. We can also see from round j ¼ 4 that, condi-
tioning on the prediction in round j being tails, those who
‘‘bought the prediction in j’’ and observed ‘‘a streak of tails
up to j  1’’ are statistically less likely to bet heads in round
j if the prediction for round j is tails; here, the net effect is
(0.387  0.298 ¼ 0.685; SE ¼ 0.111), which means
that we cannot reject the null of 0 at conventional confi-
dence levels.
The results of table 1 imply that participants who paid
for the prediction in round j, presumably because they had
9 Although qualitatively the same results can also obtained using a non-
linear model (marginal probit); see appendix C in the online supplement.
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(randomly) received accurate predictions in the previous
rounds, will likely use them to guide how they place their
bets in the same round, thus providing us with partial evi-
dence that betting behaviors of prediction buyers are influ-
enced more by the hot hand of the envelopes rather than by
the gambler’s fallacy of previous coin outcomes.
B. Will People Pay for Transparently Useless Information?
Do people who randomly receive correct (incorrect) pre-
dictions then perceive in the hot hand (cold hand) of the
predicting envelopes and thus start paying for such trans-
parently useless information? If so, how long is it before
they start buying? We found the answers to be: yes, and not
long.
Figure 2 first illustrates this using the raw data of the
pooled Thai and Singaporean sample. Conditioning on non-
first-round buyers, the ratio of people who paid for round
j’s prediction increases from around 9% in round j ¼ 2 to
43% in round j ¼ 5, providing that they had just previously
observed a streak of correct predictions up to round j1.
The rise is also monotonic and statistically well determined
throughout. The ratios of buyers to nonbuyers are much
lower (1% to 4%) among those who observed a mix of cor-
rect and incorrect predictions. It is only after observing four
consecutive incorrect predictions that we see a noticeable
increase in the proportion of participants paying for the pre-
diction in the final round, with the ratio of buyers to non-
buyers at 17%. A similar picture is observed when we split
the sample by countries (see figure 3), although the patterns
are noticeably more robust for the Thai sample than for the
Singaporean sample.
Table 2 presents the results more formally through the
use of multivariate regressions. Based on equation (5), the
control variables here include gender, nationality, propor-
tion of correct answers in statistical test, endowment in
round j, a streak of coins coming up heads or tails up to
round j  1, a dummy representing whether the subject had
TABLE 1.—TESTING THE GAMBLER’S FALLACY IN PEOPLE’S BETTING BEHAVIORS
Round j ¼ 3 Round j ¼ 4
Dependent Variable: Prediction Prediction Prediction Prediction
Betting Head in Round All ¼ H ¼ T All ¼ H ¼ T
A streak of coin coming up heads up to j  1 0.310*** 0.277** 0.375*** 0.284*** 0.317 0.408***
[0.0858] [0.122] [0.129] [0.100] [0.217] [0.152]
A streak of coin coming up tails up to j  1 0.180*** 0.166* 0.174* 0.120* 0.203* 0.150
[0.0608] [0.0878] [0.0911] [0.0717] [0.113] [0.128]
Bought the prediction in round j 0.0151 0.702*** 0.0671 0.387***
[0.307] [0.0795] [0.161] [0.138]
A streak of heads  bought prediction in j 0.582* 0.536** 0.0948
[0.318] [0.263] [0.202]
A streak of tails  bought prediction in j 0.167 0.0942 0.298*
[0.312] [0.239] [0.178]
Male 0.0645 0.0852 0.00982 0.192** 0.0355
[0.0494] [0.0702] [0.0703] [0.0770] [0.0792]
Singaporean 0.0282 0.0118 0.0588 0.0489 0.147*
[0.0648] [0.0898] [0.0955] [0.0881] [0.0885]
Constant 0.623*** 0.607*** 0.698*** 0.588*** 0.474*** 0.518***
[0.0559] [0.0812] [0.0820] [0.0282] [0.0726] [0.0714]
Implied net effects on betting head in round j
Streak of heads up to j  1 and bought prediction 0.597*** 0.602*** 0.292***
[0.083] [0.209] [0.143]
Streak of tails up to j  1 and bought prediction 0.182*** 0.607*** 0.685***
[0.054] [0.224] [0.111]
Observations 322 164 158 322 165 157
R2 0.196 0.175 0.310 0.028 0.075 0.135
Significant at * < 10%, ** < 5%, *** < 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In round j ¼ 3, there were 118 observations (31.2%) with a streak of coins coming up heads up to j ¼ 2, and 152 observations
(40.2%) with a streak of coins coming up tails up to j ¼ 2. In round j ¼ 4, there were 23 observations (6.1%) with a streak of coins coming up heads up to j ¼ 3 and 48 observations (12.7%) with a streak of coins
coming up tails up to j ¼ 3. All regressions are estimated using a linear probability model and conditioning on non-prediction-buyers in the first round.
FIGURE 2.—PROPORTION OF PREDICTION BUYERS BY TYPES OF PREDICTION STREAKS
These are raw means and conditioning on nonprediction buyers in the first round. The 2-standard-error
bands (95% CI) are reported, 2 above and 2 below SE.
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made a wrong bet in the previous round and its interaction
with the buying decision in round j  1, a dummy for
whether the subject bet heads or tails in every round, and an
indicator variable representing whether the subject acted
according to the prediction in round j  1 and its interaction
with the buying decision in round j  1.
Here we can see that the general patterns in our earlier
figures are preserved here in our linear probability esti-
mates, with or without additional control variables. For
example, in the full specification, the estimated probability
of buying round 2’s prediction for those who previously
received a correct prediction in the first round are 5.5 per-
centage points higher than for those who previously
received an incorrect prediction. The positive gradient in
the buying decision as we move through rounds is also
noticeable and individually statistically well determined;
holding the decision to buy in round j  1 constant, prob-
abilities of buying are 15 percentage points in round j ¼ 3,
21 percentage points in round j ¼ 4, and 27 percentage
points in round j ¼ 5. By contrast, the coefficient All pre-
dictions up to j  1 had been incorrect is statistically signif-
icantly different from 0 only in the final round of coin flip.
For individuals whose previous predictions had been incor-
rect four times in a row, the probability of buying is 16 per-
centage points higher than those whose previous predictions
were a mixture of successes and failures.
The empirical evidence of a monotonic rise in the ratio
of buyers to nonbuyers for those whose previous predictions
up to j  1 had been correct, and a sharp rise in the same
ratio in the final round for those whose previous predictions
up to j  1 had been incorrect, suggests that a significant
number of subjects had come to believe in the predictability
of the envelopes after having observed a streak of success-
ful and failed predictions being made live in the lab. To tra-
ditional economists, this finding is probably intuitively dif-
ficult to explain. Economic models such as the dynamic
inference model developed by Rabin and Vayanos (2010)
predict that when people are confident that no human skill
is involved in making accurate predictions of truly i.i.d.
events, a prediction of a future coin flip is worth as much as
a blank sheet of paper in an envelope, and people will not
pay for such transparently useless advice. Our experiment,
however, provides statistically convincing evidence that
rejects the idea that when individuals are absolutely rational
(recall that these are nonbuyers in the first round), they will
remain so throughout the repeated random trial.
Other results in table 2 are also interesting. There is some
evidence in the final round that the buying decision is also
persistent in itself: the coefficient Bought prediction in
round j  1 is positive and statistically significant at con-
ventional confidence levels in round j ¼ 5. There is no dif-
ference in the buying behaviors between men and women,
Singaporean and Thai subjects, or endowment levels. The
coefficients Proportion of correct answers in statistical test
have the anticipated negative sign, although they are not
statistically significantly different from 0 in the first three
rounds of coin flip. The relationship between observing a
streak of heads or tails up to j  1 and the propensity to buy
a prediction in round j is not statistically robust in either
round j ¼ 3 or round j ¼ 4. The coefficients on Fixed bet-
ting strategy are negative, albeit statistically significant,
only in round j ¼ 4. There is also no evidence to suggest
that people who bought the prediction in round j  1 and
acted accordingly are more or less likely to buy the predic-
tion again in round j. Finally, people who bought predic-
tions that later turned out to be bogus—the interaction term
FIGURES 3.—PROPORTION OF PREDICTION BUYERS BY TYPES OF PREDICTION STREAKS AND NATIONALITY
These are raw means and conditioning on nonprediction buyers in the first round. The 2-standard-error bands (95% C.I.) are reported (2 above and 2 below SE).
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between Bought prediction in j  1 and Made wrong bet in
j  1—are significantly less likely to buy in future rounds.
One question of interest is whether an individual’s ten-
dency to buy is different for different groups of people.
Though not reported here, we found no statistically signifi-
cant slope differences by gender or nationality or in the test
score of buying behavior among subjects who randomly
received correct as well as incorrect predictions. This is the
case even when the initial endowment in Singapore is sig-
nificantly larger than that in Thailand and, consequently,
prediction purchases are less costly for Singaporeans than
for Thai participants (3.33% and 10% of initial endowment,
respectively).10 This implies that the perceived hot hand in
the envelopes predicting the future is not statistically more
pronounced for males compared to females, the Singapor-
ean sample compared to the Thai sample, or those who
scored better on average in statistics and probabilities. In
short, there is no statistical evidence to support the notion
that some people are systematically more (or less) suscepti-
ble to such an irrational behavior.
We next carry out a test on people’s behaviors toward the
paid-for predictions to see whether they are influenced more
by the gambler’s fallacy or by the hot or cold hand fallacy
of the predicting envelopes. Using the same control vari-
ables in equation (6) as in the previous table, we show in
table 3 that prediction buyers tend to bet according to
(rather than against) the paid-for prediction after observing
a streak of correct predictions up to round j  1. This is
more consistent with the hot hand fallacy, as prediction
buyers who had previously observed a streak of correct pre-
TABLE 2.—LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL ESTIMATES OF FACTORS DETERMINING THE DECISION TO BUY PREDICTION IN EACH ROUND
Dependent Variable: Buy Prediction in j ¼ 2 j ¼ 3 j ¼ 4 j ¼ 5
Without controls
All predictions up to j  1 had been correct 0.0568** 0.153*** 0.265*** 0.341***
[0.0262] [0.0434] [0.0688] [0.102]
All predictions up to j  1 had been incorrect 0.00242 0.0458 0.144*
[0.0160] [0.0400] [0.0837]
Bought prediction in round j  1 0.0976 0.153* 0.278***
[0.0811] [0.0839] [0.0977]
Constant 0.0307** 0.0121 0.0188* 0.0378***
[0.0135] [0.0106] [0.0111] [0.0126]
Observations 323 323 323 323
R2 0.015 0.097 0.159 0.189
With controls
All predictions up to j  1 had been correct 0.0552** 0.153*** 0.211*** 0.273***
[0.0262] [0.0428] [0.0729] [0.104]
All predictions up to j  1 had been incorrect 0.00643 0.0427 0.156*
[0.0158] [0.0385] [0.0798]
Bought prediction in round j  1 0.326 0.199 0.540***
[0.289] [0.180] [0.190]
Male 0.0119 0.0151 0.00503 0.0231
[0.0254] [0.0248] [0.0244] [0.0261]
Singaporean 0.0373 0.0561 0.0119 0.0475
[0.0626] [0.0540] [0.0375] [0.0401]
Proportion of correct answers in statistical test 0.00609 0.0689 0.0131 0.104
[0.0501] [0.0668] [0.0518] [0.0652]
Endowment in round j 0.000139 0.000161 0.000174 0.00016*
[0.000229] [0.000148] [0.000150] [9.02e-05]
A streak of coin coming up heads up to j  1 0.0683 0.0437
[0.0495] [0.0749]
A streak of coin coming up tails up to j  1 0.00786 0.0341 0.124***
[0.0359] [0.0427] [0.0387]
Made wrong bet in j  1 0.0182 0.00383 0.0327 0.0712**
[0.0331] [0.0280] [0.0343] [0.0316]
Bought prediction in j  1 Made wrong bet in j  1 0.0406 0.472*** 0.493***
[0.152] [0.163] [0.190]
Fixed betting strategy (bet H or T in all) js 0.0390 0.0379 0.0622** 0.0110
[0.0249] [0.0275] [0.0289] [0.0251]
Bet the same as the predicted envelope in j  1 0.0108 0.000208 0.0128 0.0338
[0.0266] [0.0232] [0.0280] [0.0266]
Bought prediction in j  1  Bet the same as envelope in j  1 0.258 0.247 0.0530
[0.295] [0.182] [0.153]
Constant 0.0528 0.0900 0.0786 0.226***
[0.0506] [0.0640] [0.0508] [0.0710]
Observations 323 323 323 323
R2 0.030 0.137 0.227 0.293
Significant at * < 10%; ** < 5%; *** < 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated using a linear probability model and conditioning on nonprediction buyers in the first round.
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the subject paid to see the prediction in the corresponding numbered envelope and 0 otherwise. Reference groups are female, Thai students, no
streak up to j  1, and made correct bet in j  1.
10 Qualitatively similar results hold when we reestimate the buying
equation by participants’ nationality. See the results reported in appendix
D in the online supplement.
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dictions up to the previous round are 35.4% and 58.1%
more likely than the average nonbuyers to bet according to
the prediction in rounds j ¼ 2 and j ¼ 3, respectively. The
estimated figure continues to rise to around 70% in round
j ¼ 4 before dropping to 42.7% in the final round.
The evidence in support of the gambler’s fallacy beha-
viors following a streak of incorrect predictions is, how-
ever, mixed. For example, we can see that prediction buyers
who had previously observed a streak of incorrect predic-
tions up to the previous round are 53% more likely to bet
the same as the paid-for prediction in round j ¼ 3, which is
more consistent with the gambler’s fallacy previously stated
in H3. However, a further analysis also reveals that follow-
ing a streak of incorrect predictions, subjects are approxi-
mately 43% less likely to bet according to the paid-for pre-
diction in round j ¼ 5, which is more consistent with the
hot hand effect stated in hypothesis 5.
More generally, these numbers are essentially telling us
that for the most part, the betting behaviors of prediction
buyers are influenced more strongly by the hot hand and not
by the gambler’s fallacy of the predicting envelopes.
What about the betting and subsequent buying behaviors
of those with a (potentially) positive prior: the first-round
buyers? Are they significantly different from the non-first-
round buyers? Table 4, which reestimates the specification
of table 1 on the much smaller subsample of first-time
buyers (N ¼ 55), suggests that both first-round buyers and
nonbuyers exhibit similar propensities to the gambler’s fal-
lacy in their betting behaviors. The coefficient A streak of
coins coming up heads up to j  1 in the betting heads
equation is 0.342 [SE ¼ 0.144] in round j ¼ 3, which is
similar to the 0.310 [SE ¼ 0.061] observed earlier for the
non-first-round buyers.
We can see from the buying equation of table 5 that the
estimated hot hand effect in round j ¼ 3 is almost twice the
size of the same coefficient obtained without additional
control variables in table 2. The coefficients All predictions
up to j  1 had been correct are 0.295 [SE ¼ 0.142] in
round j ¼ 3 for the first-round buyers and 0.153 [SE ¼
0.043] in the same round for the non-first-round buyers.
This suggests evidence that the first-round buyers con-
verged more quickly toward the belief that the envelopes
TABLE 4.—THE GAMBLER’S FALLACY IN FIRST-ROUND BUYERS, ROUND J ¼ 3
Dependent Variable: Betting Head in Round j All Prediction ¼ H Prediction ¼ T
A streak of coin coming up heads up to j  1 0.342* 0.500* 0.338
[0.144] [0.179] [0.229]
A streak of coin coming up tails up to j  1 0.0921 0.167 0.131
[0.141] [0.172] [0.181]
Bought the prediction in round j 1.03e-15 0.576*
[1.18e-08] [0.317]
A streak of heads  bought prediction in j 1.31e-15 0.00433
[0.438] [0.379]
A streak of tails  bought prediction in j 0.202
[0.352]
Constant 0.842*** 1.000*** 0.909***
[0.0860] [3.73e-09] [0.0962]
Observations 55 23 32
R2 0.104 0.213 0.295
Significant at * < 10%, ** < 5%, *** < 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See table 1. Because of the small sample size, no additional controls were included.
TABLE 3.—TESTING THE GAMBLER’S FALLACY VERSUS THE HOT HAND FALLACY IN BEHAVIORS TOWARD THE PAID-FOR PREDICTIONS
Dependent Variable: Bet the same as the envelope in round j j ¼ 2 j ¼ 3 j ¼ 4 j ¼ 5
All predictions up to j  1 had been correct 0.0359 0.0619 0.171* 0.0249
[0.0584] [0.0756] [0.0972] [0.147]
All predictions up to j  1 had been incorrect 0.0124 0.0318 0.0943
[0.0700] [0.0876] [0.124]
Bought the prediction in round j 0.271* 0.217 0.0756 0.297**
[0.157] [0.340] [0.198] [0.126]
All predictions up to j  1 had been correct  Bought prediction in j 0.0830 0.799** 0.623*** 0.130
[0.190] [0.350] [0.222] [0.196]
All predictions up to j  1 had been incorrect  Bought prediction in j 0.744** 0.228 0.743***
[0.350] [0.387] [0.175]
Implied effect of betting the same as the prediction
Bought the prediction in j and all predictions had been correct up to j  1 0.354*** 0.581*** 0.698*** 0.427***
[0.105] [0.072] [0.096] [0.170]
Bought the prediction in j and all predictions had been incorrect up to j  1 0.526*** 0.152 0.445***
[0.088] [0.330] [0.127]
Observations 323 323 323 323
R2 0.052 0.083 0.072 0.068
Significant at * < 10%; ** < 5%; *** < 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the subject bet according to the prediction in the corresponding round. Same con-
trol variables as in table 2.
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have some predictive power, compared to the non-first-
round buyers (those who have either a 0 or a negative prior
at the beginning of the experiment). This supports the ear-
lier decision to exclude this smaller sample from our initial
analysis.11
There are several potential objections to our results. The
first is that participants bought the predictions only to please
the experimenters. However, if this was the case, then we
would have expected to see a similar buying pattern
between the treated and those in the control group. We did
not. The second is that the presence of envelopes them-
selves may have added an unknown element to how each
individual calculated his or her expected utility from pla-
cing such bets. For instance, one could imagine each parti-
cipant thinking at the start of the experiment, ‘‘I know that
predictions contained within these envelopes are useless.
But if they are really useless, then why would they be here
in the first place?’’ It is therefore easy to rationalize after
seeing a streak of correct predictions being made by these
envelopes that the experimenters are ‘‘up to something’’—
perhaps through some type of magic trick—and it would
thus be better for the participants to buy the predictions
even if they do not really believe in their predictability.12
While we cannot completely deny such beliefs in our
volunteer participants, we can nevertheless shed further
light on this issue. To do this, we asked our participants in
Singapore to state their reasons in the postexperimental
questionnaire for buying at least one of the predictions (if
they did at some point) and for not buying the predictions
(if they did not). The results provide interesting insights
into people’s purchasing decisions.
Participants whose predictions were of mixed successes
gave reasons for not buying that are mostly rational: ‘‘Coin
tosses are random,’’ ‘‘For this experiment, the outcomes are
not predictable,’’ ‘‘I believe in my own choices,’’ ‘‘Predic-
tions are as good as my own guess,’’ ‘‘Predictions are ran-
dom and a waste of money.’’ For a larger proportion of par-
ticipants whose predictions had been correct four times in a
row, their reasons for buying are mainly consistent with the
belief in the hot hand of an invisible agent rather than explic-
itly state that the experimenters were up to some trickery:
‘‘Predictions had been more successful than placing own
bets,’’ ‘‘The past predictions were correct,’’ ‘‘Based on the
accuracy of past predictions.’’ Participants whose predictions
had been correct up to round j  1 but not in j gave reasons
for buying that are a mixture of ex post rationalizations,
excuses, and sometimes regrets: ‘‘I could not think of an out-
come to bet on my own,’’ ‘‘Out of curiosity,’’ ‘‘I am stupid to
buy it.’’
C. Do Buyers Treat Paid-For Predictions Seriously?
One way of inferring whether buyers treated the paid-for
predictions seriously is to examine the amount of a bet
placed by buyers compared to nonbuyers. The hypothesis
here is that people who bought the predictions will feel,
through the process of rationalization, more confident about
future outcomes and subsequently place higher bets than
nonbuyers; they who still believe that coin flips are i.i.d.
and therefore systematically unpredictable. We formally
test this hypothesis in table 6 by running, for each round j,
a regression equation in which the dependent variable is
the log of the endowment amount used to bet in round j,
equation (7). The control variables here are the same as in
table 2.
On average, the bet amount placed by buyers is between
27 and 51 percentage points higher than nonbuyers in the
final three rounds. The estimated effects are statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels in rounds j ¼ 3 and 5, and
are robust to controlling for the previous bet amount, the
current endowment level, gender, and nationality, among
other things. These results provide strong evidence, of both
statistical and economic significance, that buyers place a
significant level of trust on the ‘‘hot’’ envelopes rather than
buy them to satisfy their own curiosity or simply for fun.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
An experimental game in which people guess and bet on
the outcomes of ‘‘fair’’ coin tosses is ostensibly simple. Yet
behind its simplicity lies its unique strength. Given that the
coin is fair (in that it had been proven fair by various explicit
processes), it should be universally irrefutable that the exact
sequence of future coin tosses is systematically unpredict-
able.13 Participants’ predictions should therefore be influ-
TABLE 5.—BUYING BEHAVIORS OF FIRST-ROUND BUYERS
Dependent variable: Buy prediction in round j j ¼ 2 j ¼ 3
All predictions up to j  1 had been correct 0.165 0.295**
[0.108] [0.142]
All predictions up to j  1 had been incorrect 0.0356
[0.0942]
Bought prediction in round j  1 0.260*
[0.131]
Constant 0.125* 0.0213
[0.0688] [0.0489]
Observations 55 55
R2 0.039 0.185
Significant at * < 10%, ** < 5%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See table 2.
11 However, for the sake of completeness, similar conclusions are
obtained from the pooled data analysis (combined first-round and non-
first-round buyers). See Powdthavee and Riyanto (2012) for the pooled
data estimates.
12 Similarly, one could also imagine investors in the stock market think-
ing along the same lines about financial experts: ‘‘If stock prices really
follow a random walk, then why do financial experts exist? And not only
do they exist, they also get paid incredible sums of money to comment on
something that is i.i.d. in nature!’’ And then when we see a streak of suc-
cessful performances by these financial experts, we readily use it as justi-
fication, for their existence and for the large paychecks they typically
receive.
13 This is unlike the belief that past returns do not predict future returns
in the stock market, the truth of which many people spend years debating
and researching. Prior beliefs about the predictability of randomly
selected coin flips should be more absolute and universal.
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enced by the gambler’s fallacy rather than the random accu-
racy of the envelope’s predictions. Such a setting provides a
perfect experimental setting in which to test the boundaries
of people’s beliefs in the folly of coin flip predictions.
However, our findings take us, and perhaps many others,
by surprise.14 When randomized predictions are introduced
into the game as a potential information good, it takes only
a few past realizations of correct predictions for individuals
to start forming the belief that transparently i.i.d. outcomes
are systematically predictable and that the prefixed envel-
opes contain information worth paying for. The influence of
such ‘‘bogus’’ predictions is sufficiently large to offset the
gambler’s fallacy and induce buyers to place higher bets on
average than nonbuyers.
Indeed, we believe that our laboratory experiment pro-
vides results that are essentially predictable by the dynamic
inference model of Rabin and Vayanos (2010). Our contri-
bution, however, is that these results are obtained even
without the key assumption—that individuals are a priori
uncertain about the underlying process generating the
data—needing to hold. In other words, our experiment
establishes a new lower bound of how people’s beliefs in
transparently useless predictions can be formed: partici-
pants are not entirely protected from irrational learning
even when, at the beginning of the experiment, these indivi-
duals had started with a very strong prior about the ability
of the predicting agent. Our results call for the need to look
outside the economic discipline for an alternative explana-
tion of such puzzling findings.
One potential explanation is in the work of the psycholo-
gist Justin Barrett. In his hypersensitive agency detection
device theory, humans are hardwired to detect patterns in
otherwise unrelated events, details that defy straightforward
explanations, or consequences that seem out of proportion
to the alleged cause. Such sensitivity to detecting agents
even when none exists has several evolutionary advantages.
For example, spotting and understanding other agents could
have been key to survival for early humans and thus conti-
TABLE 6.—OLS ESTIMATES OF THE LOG OF BET AMOUNT PLACED IN EACH ROUND
Dependent Variable: ln(Bet Amount in Round j) j ¼ 2 j ¼ 3 j ¼ 4 j ¼ 5
Bought prediction in round j 0.00114 0.511** 0.273 0.375**
[0.156] [0.208] [0.196] [0.145]
Bought prediction in round j  1 0.483 0.678 0.198
[0.731] [0.446] [0.253]
Ln(bet amount in round j  1) 0.577** 0.725** 0.738** 0.736**
[0.0651] [0.0590] [0.0729] [0.0703]
Male 0.000994 0.0832 0.0338 0.116
[0.0658] [0.0673] [0.0763] [0.0902]
Singaporean 1.087*** 0.492*** 0.404*** 0.127
[0.215] [0.135] [0.116] [0.127]
Proportion of correct answers in statistical test 0.0943 0.147 0.162 0.0716
[0.153] [0.137] [0.155] [0.177]
Endowment in round j 0.00427*** 0.00181*** 0.273 0.00108**
[0.000991] [0.000501] [0.196] [0.000478]
A streak of coin coming up heads up to j  1 0.0214 0.156
[0.105] [0.133]
A streak of coin coming up tails up to j  1 0.165** 0.0115 0.309**
[0.0824] [0.123] [0.140]
Made wrong bet in j  1 0.946*** 1.093*** 0.710*** 0.838***
[0.0937] [0.0833] [0.0977] [0.104]
Bought prediction in j  1 Made wrong bet in j  1 0.0603 0.467 0.863***
[0.367] [0.446] [0.277]
Fixed betting strategy—bet H or T in all js 0.0551 0.125 0.158* 0.135
[0.0836] [0.0772] [0.0883] [0.101]
Bet the same as the predicted envelope in j  1 0.0671 0.0274 0.0851 0.0893
[0.0628] [0.0632] [0.0723] [0.0879]
Bought prediction in j  1  Bet the same as envelope in j  1 0.564 0.743*** 0.0526
[0.711] [0.225] [0.212]
Constant 2.160** 1.408** 1.146** 1.618**
[0.224] [0.195] [0.187] [0.243]
Observations 321 320 321 319
R2 0.396 0.546 0.469 0.452
Significant at * < 10%; ** < 5%; *** < 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the bet amount placed in round j. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
14 This comment is made in part to reflect how the earlier draft of this
paper has been surprisingly received in the media and by the general pub-
lic. Since its online publication as an IZA discussion paper in May 2012
(Powdthavee & Riyanto, 2012), our results have been discussed at great
length—despite having had no press release—on the Freakonomics blog
www.freakonomics.com/blog/ (‘‘Paying for ‘Transparently Useless
Advice,’’’ June 6, 2012), New Statesman (‘‘If You’ve Got Lucky, It’s
Easy to Convince People You’re a Sage,’’ June 6, 2012), Economist
(‘‘Buttonwood: Not So Expert,’’ June 9, 2012), Financial Times (‘‘Heads
or Tails? Just Don’t Bet on It,’’ June 15, 2012), and Wall Street Journal
(‘‘People Will Pay for ‘Transparently Useless Advice’ about Chance
Events,’’ June 18, 2012), among others. Even we, the experimenters,
nearly gave up with the idea of this project before we had even started
simply because we had difficulty believing anybody would be willing to
pay for predictions of obviously fair coin flips.
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nuing to reproduce: it is far better to avoid several imagin-
ary predators than be eaten by a real one. Since there is such
a high cost of failing to detect agents and a low cost of
wrongly detecting them, evolution will select an inheritable
tendency to overdetect agents, even when we do not see
them, as a survival strategy (Barrett, 2004; Gray & Wegner,
2010). The way we set up our experiment, which randomly
allowed some participants to experience implausible streaks
of accurate predictions, may have helped to trigger the
hypersensitive agency detection device for these indivi-
duals, thus leading them to believe in the hot hand of an
invisible agent when there was none.
Our results also open up a new discussion that perhaps
people buy expert predictions (which are transparently use-
less in our case) not for their predictability but rather for
other psychological reasons.15 For example, our partici-
pants may have bought the predictions to:
 Delegate decision making. Participants know that their
choice is no better than a random envelope’s choice.
Nevertheless, if the decision is wrong, at least they can
blame the envelope and not themselves.
 Avoid regret. Participants know that they will learn the
information in the envelope at the end of each coin flip
for free. However, they may not want to regret not hav-
ing that information if it turns out to be correct. Since
regret is powerful, they may instead want to pay the
small fee to avoid it.
 Feel in control of the situation. Participants may buy
the predictions simply to feel in control of a situation
in which they have no control over the outcomes. Like
regrets, the ability to feel in control of an uncontrolla-
ble situation is a powerful emotion, and participants
may be willing to pay a small fee to be in the posses-
sion of it (Langer, 1975).
 Psychic hedge. It may be that participants formally go
with the predictions in the envelope even when they do
not formally believe that it has any predictive power.
This way, regardless of what happens, they win (at least
psychically).
Equally interesting are the potential implications of our
findings across social science disciplines. What we have
learned, other than that people are not completely immune
to irrational learning, is that it is unimaginably easy and
costs almost nothing for ‘‘experts’’ to manufacture falla-
cious beliefs that even truly i.i.d. events are predictable.
This is primarily because, according to Philip Tetlock
(2006), experts are not punished sufficiently when they are
wrong and will not admit to being wrong when they are. On
the contrary, the benefit of predicting unpredictable events
correctly, even if rarely, significantly outweighs the cost of
not getting them right. Since experts are usually paid for
their services, paid better when they give ‘‘good’’ advice,
and are not severely punished when they make incorrect
decisions, we are essentially rewarding bad judgments over
good ones at no cost to the overall demand for expert
advice.
Hence, with the existing system of expertise, financial
firms could in principle provide their customers with var-
ious mutual funds containing randomly chosen stocks and
then build their advertisements around those that outper-
form the market by chance. Since people also buy transpar-
ently useless information for many psychological reasons
other than for their predictability, their demands for finan-
cial advice are likely to be inelastic with respect to the
prices that financial firms typically charge their clients for
their services.16 This is the case even when it may be clear
to everyone involved that market evaluations revert to the
mean over the long term and that such advice is not needed
very often in reality. Moreover, economists and political
forecasters can hand out random predictions about future
economic and political crises and would be tantalizingly
rewarded when they are right and yet would not be held
accountable for misprediction when they are wrong.
Our experiment highlights these flaws in the current sys-
tem of expertise and argues that it may not be sufficient to
leave it to individuals to judge for themselves whether an
expensive expertise is worth paying for. This is the case
even in situations where it should be transparent to every-
one that outcomes are dominated by pure randomness. Our
results also underscore the problem that years of using sta-
tistics cannot offset the erroneous intuitions we sometimes
have about the hot hand of an expert after streaks of accu-
rate predictions are observed.
This raises an important question: If teaching people
about statistics do not help to minimize these mistakes, how
can we create a mechanism that will? One potential solution
to this problem may come in the form of prediction markets
(Wolfer & Zitzewitz, 2006; Arrow et al., 2008). Prediction
markets, or information markets, allow participants to gen-
erate various contracts and price them on the basis of an
aggregation of collective predictions of outcomes of some
future events made by market participants and then trade
them in the market at a price. The wisdom of the crowd
underlying prediction markets offers a better alternative to
the prediction provided by single (or few) expert(s). A typi-
cal example of a contract in the prediction market is a fore-
cast that candidate X will win the next presidential election,
which could be traded in the market at, for example, US$1.
If the market price of such a contract is currently 40 cents,
an interpretation is that the market ‘‘believes’’ candidate X
has a 40% chance of winning the election. Provided that the
market is efficient, the price of the contract perfectly aggre-
15 We are especially grateful to Dan Houser for giving us advice on
likely alternative psychological explanations of our results.
16 A good reference for this comes in the review by Inderst and Otta-
viani (2012). According to a recent survey of the market, the majority of
U.S. retail investors (approximately 73%) consult a financial adviser
before purchasing shares.
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gates dispersed information about the probability of candi-
date X being elected.
The promise of prediction markets is that, owing to the
law of large numbers, the market prices will often produce
aggregated forecasts of event outcomes that have lower pre-
diction errors than predictions generated by a single or a
few ‘‘experts.’’ Participants in the prediction markets also
have a clear financial incentive for truthful revelation of
true beliefs as losses will be made if predictions turn out to
be wrong. More important, prices in the prediction market
can also be used as an aggregated indicator of whether the
event in question is random or predictable—aggregate
prices should be lower for events that are significantly more
random in nature—which may help to improve investment
decisions for individuals looking to invest.
We began this paper by noting a divide between the eco-
nomics and psychology literature. Our experimental results
seem to provide novel evidence in favor of psychological
explanations for the apparent demands for useless predic-
tions. It appears that economists may need to readjust their
prior beliefs about where the lower bound—between
rational and irrational beliefs—actually lies. Future research
may need to return to this to construct a general quantitative
model of such ‘‘irrational learning’’ that can be applied
across a wide variety of settings and to determine cost-
effective ways (other than the promise of prediction mar-
kets) to help minimize these mistakes in the market.
REFERENCES
Arrow, Kenneth J., Robert Forsythe, Michael Gorham et al., ‘‘The Prom-
ise of Prediction Markets,’’ Science (2008), 877–878.
Asparouhova, Elena, Michael Hertzel, and Michael Lemmon, ‘‘Inference
from Streaks in Random Outcomes: Experimental Evidence on
Beliefs in Regime Shifting and the Law of Small Numbers,’’ Man-
agement Science 55 (2009), 1766–1782.
Ayton, Peter, and Ilan Fischer, ‘‘The Hot Hand Fallacy and the Gambler’s
Fallacy: Two Faces of Subjective Randomness?’’ Memory and
Cognition 32 (2004), 1369–1378.
Barrett, Justin L., Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Walnut Creek,
CA: AltaMira Press, 2004).
Burns, Bruce D., and Bryan Corpus, Randomness and Inductions from
Streaks: ‘‘Gambler’s Fallacy’’ versus ‘‘Hot Hand,’’ Psychonomic
Bulletin and Review 11 (2004), 179–184.
Cahart, Mark, ‘‘On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance,’’ Journal of
Finance 52 (1997), 57–82.
Chater, Nick, Steffen Huck, and Roman Inderst, ‘‘Consumer Decision-
Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural Economics
Perspective,’’ Report to the European Commission/SANCO (2010).
Clotfelter, Charles, and Phil Cook, ‘‘Lotteries in the Real World,’’ Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty 4 (1991), 227–232.
——— ‘‘Notes: The ‘Gambler’s Fallacy’ in Lottery Play,’’ Management
Science 39 (1993) 1521–1525.
Croson, Rachel, and James Sundali, ‘‘The Gambler’s Fallacy and the Hot
Hand: Empirical Data from Casinos,’’ Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty 30 (2005), 195–209.
Fama, Eugene F., ‘‘Efficient Capital Markets: II,’’ Journal of Finance 46
(1991), 1575–1617.
Fischbacher, Urs, ‘‘Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic
Experiments,’’ Experimental Economics 10 (2007), 171–178.
Gilovich, Thomas, Robert Vallone, and Amos Tversky, ’’The Hot Hand
in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences,’’ Cog-
nitive Psychology 17 (1985), 295–314.
Gray, Kurt, and Daniel M. Wegner, ‘‘Blaming God for Our Pain: Human
Suffering and the Divine Mind,’’ Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy Review 14 (2010), 7–16.
Guryan, Jonathan, and Melissa S. Kearney, ‘‘Gambling at Lucky Stores:
Empirical Evidence from State Lottery Sales,’’ American Eco-
nomic Review 98 (2008), 458–473.
Huber, Jurgen, Michael Kirchler, and Thomas Stockl, ‘‘The Hot Hand
Belief and the Gambler’s Fallacy in Investment Decisions under
Risk,’’ Theory and Decision 68 (2010), 445–462.
Hung, Angela A., Noreen Clancy, Jeff Dominitz, Eric Talley, Claude Ber-
rebi, and Farrukh Suvankulov, ‘‘Investor and Industry Perspectives
on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers,’’ RAND Institute for
Civil Justice Technical Report (2008).
Inderst, Roman, and Marco Ottaviani, ‘‘Financial Advice,’’ Journal of
Economic Literature 50 (2012), 494–512.
Jørgensen, Claus Bjørn, Sigrid Suetens, and Jean-Robert Tyran, ‘‘Pre-
dicting Lotto Numbers,’’ CEPR discussion paper 8314 (2011).
Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Allen Lane: Penguin Books,
2011).
Langer, Ellen, ‘‘The Illusion of Control,’’ Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 32 (1975), 311–328.
Powdthavee, Nattavudh, and Yohanes E. Riyanto, ‘‘Why Do People Pay
for Useless Information? Implications of Gambler’s and Hot-Hand
Fallacies in False Expert Setting,’’ IZA discussion paper series
6557 (2012).
Rabin, Matthew, ‘‘Inferences by Believers in the Law of Small Num-
bers,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002), 775–816.
Rabin, Matthew; and Dimitri Vayanos, ‘‘The Gambler’s and Hot Hand
Fallacies: Theories and Applications,’’ Review of Economic Stu-
dies 77 (2010), 730–778.
Teller, Dek, ‘‘A Test of the Gambler’s Fallacy: Evidence from Pari-
Mutuel Games,’’ Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 17 (1994), 151–
166.
Terrell, D., ‘‘Biases in Assessments of Probabilities: New Evidence from
Greyhound Races,’’ Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 17 (1998),
151–167.
Terrell, D., and A. Farmer, ‘‘Optimal Betting and Efficiency in Parimutuel
Betting Markets with Information Costs,’’ Economic Journal 106
(1996), 846–868.
Tetlock, Philip, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can
We Know? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, ‘‘Belief in the Law of Small
Numbers,’’ Psychological Bulletin 76 (1971), 105–110.
Wolfers, Justin, and Eric Zitzewitz, ‘‘Prediction Markets in Theory and
Practice,’’ NBER working paper 12083 (2006).
271WOULD YOU PAY FOR TRANSPARENTLY USELESS ADVICE?
APPENDIX A
Descriptive Statistics
Non-First-Round Buyers First-Round Buyers
All Thais Singaporeans All
Round j ¼ 2
Correct predictions up to j  1 160 80 80 31
% of all predictions 50.56% 49.08% 50.00% 56.36%
Bought prediction in j ¼ 2 19 6 8 9
% of all correct predictions up to j  1 8.75% 7.50% 10.00% 29.03%
Round j ¼ 3
Correct predictions up to j  1 81 43 38 11
% of all predictions 25.08% 26.38% 23.75% 20.00%
Bought prediction in j ¼ 3 14 9 5 4
% of all correct predictions up to j  1 17.28% 20.93% 13.16% 36.36%
Round j ¼ 4
Correct predictions up to j  1 42 24 18 6
% of all predictions 13.00% 14.72% 11.25% 10.91%
Bought prediction in j ¼ 4 13 9 4 1
% of all correct predictions up to j  1 30.95% 37.50% 22.22% 16.67%
Round j ¼ 5
Correct predictions up to j  1 22 11 11 1
% of all predictions 6.81% 6.75% 6.88% 1.82%
Bought prediction in j ¼ 5 10 5 5 0
% of all correct predictions up to j  1 45.45% 45.45% 45.45% 0.00%
N 323 163 160 55
Total N ¼ 378 (Thai: N ¼ 177; Singaporean: N ¼ 201).
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